Mansour Doghmosh
Mansour Doghmosh, born on 26 January 1995 in Palestine, represents the least structured yet still operationally relevant profile among the three defendants. Growing up in the same conflict‑laden environment as Anan Yaeesh and Ali Irar, he absorbed many of the narratives circulating within Palestinian society, including reverence for armed factions and glorification of martyrdom. However, unlike the others, his path into militancy appears more circumstantial and socially driven than rooted in long‑term operational involvement.
Mansour’s radicalization developed primarily through digital and interpersonal channels. His chats reveal fascination with fighters in Tulkarem, emotional reactions to clashes, and a willingness to participate in information‑sharing and communication support. While he did not undergo structured training or maintain longstanding militant responsibilities, he nonetheless aligned ideologically with the Brigate dei Martiri di Al‑Aqsa.
His language, the type of videos he circulated, and his references to “i ferri” (weapons) display a form of symbolic participation in the militant sphere. Mansour identified with the group’s worldview even if he was not among its central strategists.
Italian authorities categorize Mansour as a secondary operative—less central than Anan Yaeesh or Ali Irar, but still essential in certain communication loops. His role consisted mainly of relaying messages, sending videos from militants abroad, and facilitating indirect connections. He operated as a supportive satellite within the network, amplifying its media presence and serving as a trusted intermediary.
Chats show Mansour forwarding sensitive videos, descriptions of attacks, images of fighters, and commentary intended to motivate or inform Yaeesh . He reassured contacts abroad about ongoing operations and provided Yaeesh with updates on developments in Tulkarem. He also participated in discussions about logistics, attempted connections, and tactical interpretations of battlefield footage.
Although he did not manage finances or prepare operational strategies, his flow of information contributed to the organization’s internal cohesion and morale.
The investigation documents Mansour: engaging in coded discussions about weapons; circulating martyrdom videos and battlefield recordings; reacting emotionally to militant operations; and maintaining persistent communication with Anan Yaeesh and Ali Irar.
His exchanges reveal both ideological approval of violence and a desire to be useful to the organization. These behaviors, while less sophisticated than those of the other two defendants, nonetheless fall along the operational spectrum targeted by anti‑terrorism legislation.
Authorities assess Mansour as a moderate‑risk actor: ideologically aligned; operationally supportive; and potentially capable of escalating involvement if enabled by stronger organizational figures.
His role as a facilitator—rather than leader—does not eliminate the threat he poses, particularly given his embeddedness in militant social circles.
Mansour was arrested on 26 January 2024 under Art. 270 bis, along with Anan Yaeesh and Ali Irar. The court highlights his meaningful supportive contributions: relaying videos, maintaining communication lines, offering connections, and expressing operational intent. Although the evidence portrays him as less central, it nonetheless supports his inclusion within the terrorist association. However, on January 2026, he was acquitted by the L’Aquila Court along with Ali Irar; while Anan Yaeesh was convicted.
