Data Analysis

The evolution of jihadism in Italy: a brief overview

01 January 2026 by: Francesco Bergoglio Errico

Jihadist terrorism in Italy is not a recent occurrence; the first counter-terrorism operations were launched between 1993 (Operation Sphinx) and 1994 (Operation Moskea). An analysis of judicial documents regarding this period reveals a predominance of repression of criminal offences over those of a terrorist nature. Indeed, before the attacks on the Twin Towers, the criminal offence delineated in Article 416 of the Criminal Code, namely “criminal association”, constituted the primary charge in investigations directed towards the suppression of jihadist organisations. This is also due to the fact that the offence of “Participation in an association with terrorist aims, including international terrorism”, provided for in Article 270 bis, was only included in the Criminal Code in October 2001.

Further, during this period, the subjects investigated were predominantly directly associated with the “central command”. It is evident that a proportion of the individuals in question were affiliated with al-Qaeda, whilst others occupied leadership roles within terrorist organisations such as the Armed Islamic Group, the Islamic Group for Preaching and Combat, and the Jamaat al-Islamiya. Other individuals were affiliated with radical Islamic movements, including Hizb ut Tahrir, Tabligh Eddawa, and al-Nahda. A further group of individuals consisted of foot soldiers who were firmly convinced of the superiority of their convictions and of their obligation to engage in armed struggle, or jihad. These individuals were generally led by imams or cell leaders.

The primary strategic objectives of the cells located in Italy were to support the jihad network, with a particular focus on the most significant countries of the period, namely Algeria, Bosnia and Afghanistan, and to provide the network with logistical and human resources. In Italy, a significant number of counterfeit documents of various kinds, including passports and driving licences, were discovered. This phenomenon was so widespread that, following 2002, Italian documents were even found in Peshawar. Furthermore, hundreds of individuals passed through Italian territory, including prominent figures from the jihadist and Islamist scene. Also, a significant proportion of these prominent figures had the right to reside in Italy or other European countries because they had been granted international protection or political refugee status.

However, in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks, there was a considerable shift in the prevailing attitudes and policies. Italian jihadist cells were no longer able to manage entire criminal networks from mosques, as they had previously done. Secondly, the counter-terrorism authorities finally had new tools at their disposal, including the new offence of “participation in an association with terrorist aims, including international terrorism”. Thirdly, the “central command” was subjected to considerable pressure in the context of the so-called “War on Terror”, especially in the MENA region. Consequently, within a few years, with a few exceptions, jihadism in Italy and elsewhere underwent a transformation, taking on new forms and strategies.

It is evident from an examination of court records that a substantial transformation has occurred in the realm of jihadism and associated counter-terrorism activities since the end of 2001. A substantial shift has been observed in the investigative framework. Over several years, investigations that formerly encompassed numerous individuals have evolved into investigative activities that focus on a restricted number of individuals, if not a single individual. To elaborate, there has been a shift in focus from comprehensive investigations into terrorist networks to a more targeted approach, with investigations being conducted into individuals primarily involved in the dissemination of jihadist propaganda and material through online platforms such as blogs and forums.

In the context of this 9/11 post-period, jihadism has transformed both its linguistic approach and its organisational structure. The leaders and ideologues demonstrated an acute understanding of the necessity to pursue both expansion and the implementation of rigorous precautionary measures. The necessity to convey the message of jihad to non-Arabic-speaking audiences became imperative, and, in particular, it was essential to allow militants to organise themselves autonomously, without the assistance of the “central command” and without a leader.

In this regard, the Global Islamic Media Front was established in 2004, and the al-Fajr Media Centre was founded in 2006. These media channels were dedicated to the official dissemination of jihadist propaganda, both in English and other languages. The doctrine of “Nizam la Tanzim”, which translates to “system, not organisation”, was developed with the same intentions. This doctrine advocated for horizontal networks to operate autonomously and devoid of any leadership structures.

It is evident that the internet has played a pivotal role in this transformation, contributing to the amplification and intensification of jihadist activities. This period has seen significant development in data transmission technologies, with the evolution of solutions such as ADSL. Moreover, the advent of the YouTube platform and the dissemination of the first instant messaging programmes provided an additional tool for propaganda and communication. Jihadism, akin to criminal organisations, has demonstrated a capacity to swiftly assimilate and utilise emerging technologies for its own ends, often anted up to others in recognising the potential of these emerging technologies.

To further expand upon this concise overview of jihadism, 2011 unquestionably represents a pivotal turning point. From a geopolitical perspective, the Arab Spring led to the breakdown of old political and socio-economic systems in some Arab countries. From a counter-terrorism perspective, individuals of significant importance and symbolic significance were eliminated.

In May 2011, Osama Bin Laden was neutralised in Abbottabad, while in September, Anwar al Awlaki, the creator of the online magazine “Inspire”, which is still in use today, was killed in Yemen. Finally, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State in Iraq rose from its ashes and began its expansion into Syria, where in 2014 it proclaimed the establishment of the “Caliphate” from the mosque in Mosul.

Since 2011, there have been numerous changes, once again reflected in court documents, in a recurring pattern first evident at the end of 2001. Evidence from legal proceedings, pre-trial detention orders and investigative activities indicates that telematic tools and the online world have become an integral part of the lives of almost all those individuals investigated. The advent of social networks has been particularly instrumental in the proliferation of jihadism on a global scale. Until at least 2016, social platforms were distinguished by a notable level of accessibility and the presence of a wide variety of content, including instructional manuals for the construction of improvised explosive devices, advanced guides for the synthesis of ricin, propaganda in PDF format, Hollywood-style edited videos, and a plethora of other materials. The content was designed with the aim of recruiting new members and winning the “hearts and minds” of a significant segment of the youth population, including non-Arabs.

The Islamic State was the primary actor to comprehend the potential of social media’s vast information storage capacity to further its agenda. This awareness enabled the group to disseminate its content expeditiously and efficaciously, to the extent that, in the present day, the eradication of jihadist content from a social network is an insurmountable task, since once expunged, it re-emerges elsewhere within minutes.

Further, the Islamic State was the primary actor able to utilise the power of ideology and deception to generate an exodus of unprecedented proportions. It is estimated that thousands of individuals from numerous countries have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fulfil the obligation set out by their “Caliph”. A significant number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters initially engaged in combat within the ranks of the so-called “Caliphate”, with many continuing in this capacity until the territorial defeat of the organisation. A subsequent challenge faced by authorities worldwide pertained to the return of these individuals to their respective countries of origin. Consequently, even at present, the issue of returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters continues to represent a priority threat for numerous countries.

Furthermore, since 2011, both native Italians (i.e. individuals born in Italy to at least one Italian parent) and “sociologically Italian” individuals (i.e. second and third-generation immigrants) have been subject to counter-terrorism investigations. Additionally, there has been an emergence of investigations targeting women. Despite constituting a numerical minority, women have demonstrated a marked increase in their participation in jihadist activities, which has been characterised by their notable abilities and their active involvement in criminal activities, such as the indoctrination of children, the radicalisation of other women, and the support of the jihadist milieu in recruitment, proselytism, and financing, both online and offline.

In addition to the increase in women, the most recent investigations also demonstrate an increase in minors, who are particularly vulnerable to violent and brutal propaganda. In fact, in recent years, the number of arrests of minors has increased exponentially in every European country.

Finally, it is important to note the recent rise in anti-Semitism. In the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack, perpetrated by Hamas against over 1,200 unarmed civilians at the border between Gaza and Israel, there has been a notable rise in anti-Semitic sentiment within various extremist factions, encompassing a wide ideological spectrum, from the far-right to the far-left, and indeed, jihadism.

In the period following 7 October, content pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and anti-Semitic sentiment became an integral component of the propaganda material that the investigated individuals consulted. This demonstrates that the Hamas attack was a “radicalising event” of global significance, which inevitably contributed to the radicalisation of vulnerable young people and the polarisation of Italian society and beyond.

In conclusion, a comprehensive review of court documents indicates that jihadism has evolved over time and that investigated individuals employ varied methodologies in the commission of terrorist and criminal activities. The present research is grounded in the aforementioned documents, with the aim of furnishing the reader with a comprehensive overview of jihadism in Italy over the past fourteen years, from 2011 to 2025, providing detailed information on the individuals under investigation and the criminal proceedings.