Arxhend Bekaj

Arxhend Bekaj was born in Kosovo on October 17, 1995. He was part of the Kosovar diaspora that settled in Italy during the 2000s and 2010s, likely in the aftermath of the Kosovo War and ongoing economic instability in the Balkans. Arxhend is related—most likely as a younger cousin or brother—to Fisnik Bekaj, a central member of the Venice-based jihadist cell. These family ties are important in understanding how his path to radicalization unfolded, as the network he became part of was based primarily on familial and ethnic bonds.
Like other members of the group, Arxhend lived in Venice, in or near the historic center. He found work as a waiter in a restaurant catering to the tourist trade, much like the rest of the group. His employment provided a legal pretext for his presence in Italy, and there were no early warning signs that he posed a threat. His low profile, youth, and lack of prior convictions made him appear benign to the outside world.
Arxhend was considered less mature than his older cousin Fisnik and was not central to the cell’s theological debates. However, his inclusion in the network points to the way in which radicalization spreads through familial and diasporic trust rather than formal recruitment systems.

Arxhend’s radicalization was primarily the result of exposure and proximity to his cousin Fisnik Bekaj and the larger jihadist group led by Dake Haziraj and Arjan Babaj. While he was not a key ideologue or instigator, he absorbed the teachings, rhetoric, and violent aspirations of the group through frequent meetings and shared online environments.
He was included in encrypted chat groups where members shared ISIS propaganda, training materials, and ideological justifications for violence. He also followed the same radical figures online and expressed solidarity with violent jihadist ideas, often through reactions and endorsements of materials shared within the group.
Arxhend’s radicalization appears to have accelerated between late 2016 and early 2017, when the cell was becoming increasingly militant in tone and preparing to move from theory to action. During this period, he was increasingly drawn into the inner circle of planning, although he lacked the initiative or leadership role of his cousin.
Nonetheless, investigators noted that he had fully embraced the group’s ideology, and considered him part of a network of “active supporters” who were ready to aid or follow others in action. This made him dangerous by proximity and ideological loyalty, even if he lacked operational sophistication.

Arxhend’s activities largely mirrored those of the broader cell. He participated in:
• Viewing and discussing jihadist propaganda videos
• Sharing ISIS content in closed chat groups
• Praising terrorist attacks in Europe
• Discussing the merits of martyrdom and targeting “infidels”
He frequently visited the residence of Arjan Babaj, which acted as the ideological and logistical hub of the group. While he did not lead discussions, his consistent presence and enthusiastic participation in radical conversations demonstrated that he was fully indoctrinated.
One area of concern was his role in helping with logistics. There is evidence that he participated in the acquisition of knives, and Italian authorities flagged him as part of the supply network within the group. He also helped communicate between group members and may have assisted in covering activities, such as deleting incriminating messages or monitoring police presence.
His level of integration in the cell made him a potential participant in any planned attacks, even if he wasn’t central in the initial planning phase. He supported the idea of targeting the Rialto Bridge, San Marco, and the Venice Carnival, echoing enthusiasm for martyrdom and the belief that killing tourists and locals during such events would ensure divine reward.

Arxhend Bekaj played the role of a young follower and active supporter. He was ideologically committed, operationally available, and logistically helpful. His role can be broken down as:
• Ideological Follower: He adopted the ISIS worldview and consumed jihadist propaganda religiously.
• Logistical Participant: He helped procure weapons, monitored online chats, and supported group secrecy.
• Operational Backup: Though not a plot leader, he was prepared to act if instructed.
He also served as a link between younger radicals and the older ideologues, helping to reinforce the group’s cohesion. His familial bond with Fisnik gave him added trust within the circle, and his age made him a likely candidate for grooming into more advanced roles.

Arxhend Bekaj was initially placed under intense surveillance by Italian intelligence services, who flagged him as a dangerous associate of convicted jihadists. He was not arrested with the others in March 2017, but his name appeared in court documents as a key associate and possible secondary actor in the network.
In april 2017, Italian authorities determined that his presence on national territory represented a clear and ongoing threat to public safety, and he was forcibly expelled from Italy alogside Idriz Haziraj and Mergim Gecaj. His expulsion was based on anti-terrorism laws that allow administrative measures for non-citizens deemed radicalized, even without formal charges.
Upon expulsion, he was returned to Kosovo, where local intelligence services were alerted. His case is cited in counterterrorism literature as an example of “peripheral radicalization” — individuals who may not directly commit violence but serve as critical reinforcements and enablers of terrorist networks.
In October 2023, Arxhend Bekaj was arrested in Trieste and expelled from Italy again as he was deemed a danger to national security. Despite being unable to return to Italy, he crossed the Italian border with Slovenia.